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HATE SPEECH, PUBLIC ASSURANCE, AND
THE CIVIC STANDING OF SPEAKERS
AND VICTIMS
Vincent Blasi*
Jeremy Waldron and James Weinstein have opened up a
promising line of inquiry regarding the legitimacy and propriety
of hate speech regulation. In doing so, they have succeeded in
reinvigorating a subject that had grown academically formulaic
even while becoming alarmingly more salient politically and
culturally. Together they have enriched our understanding with
their specificity of argumentation, intellectual courage, fairminded attentiveness to critics and counter-arguments,
comparative law perspective, and genuine originality of
conception. I find that each has shown me at least one significant
problem in the other’s analysis, a symmetry that I consider a
tribute to both.
I.
I think that Waldron fails to grapple as fully as he needs to
with the challenges to his argument posed by the European and
Canadian cases discussed in Part Four of Weinstein’s article.1
Those are cases that involve relatively temperate instances of
speech the substantive message of which challenges the civic
standing of vulnerable minority groups. Waldron’s intriguing
claim that such minorities in a political community are entitled to
the public good of assurance of their civic dignity has much to be
said for it. However, it seems to me that this newly conceived
public good is especially implicated when the view that certain
vulnerable minorities are unworthy of civic status is publicly
articulated in a temperate manner, precisely because that manner
* Vincent Blasi is Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties at Columbia Law
School.
1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527, 552–561 (2017).
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of articulation makes the view less easily marginalized. Waldron
concedes that extreme outliers do not undercut the requisite
public assurance. The danger lies in introducing categorical civic
denigration into the way the polity looks, sounds, and feels. That
alteration of civic “aesthetics,” as Waldron puts it, is most likely
to occur when noxious heretical ideas present as respectable, or
at least eligible for respectful consideration. Hence the insidious
danger of temperate articulation. Relatedly, Waldron’s assertion,
which plays a key role in his overall argument, that Western
democracies have “settled” the question of how race and certain
other traits central to identity bear on civic status is problematized
more when heretical views relating to demography and political
membership are put forward in the form of propositions rather
than epithets. Waldron admirably avoids the mistake of conflating
the multifarious instances of hate speech into one
undifferentiated lump, but I believe that the subset of public
utterance consisting of the temperate expression of civically
noxious ideas poses more of a challenge to his position than he
recognizes.
Waldron properly observes that “our debate is about hate
speech restrictions as such, not about the least well-formulated of
them.” He urges opponents of hate speech regulation such as
Weinstein “to consider the best case that can be made for
regulation of this sort and the best drafting that has emerged from
fifty years or more of legislative experience in most advanced
democracies before attempting to show that nevertheless such
regulations are wrong in principle.”2 He notes approvingly that
Section 18(1) of the UK’s Public Order Act outlaws only an
especially aggressive subset of hate speech. To justify prosecution
under that provision, the offender must employ words or gestures
of a certain character: “threatening, abusive or insulting.”
Moreover, either the speaker must intend by his utterance to stir
up racial hatred, or such hatred must be likely to be stirred up
“having regard to all the circumstances.” Waldron contrasts this
“hate speech provision,” the type of law he aims to justify, with
less circumscribed “public order provisions,” such as Section 5 of
the same Public Order Act, that extend their prohibitions beyond
speakers who are bent on stirring up hatred directly by means of

2. Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein,
32 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 703–04 (2017).
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extremely aggressive language. The more wide-ranging Section 5,3
it should be noted, was the basis for what Weinstein argues were
the misguided criminal convictions of relatively temperate
purveyors of noxious opinions. The clear implication of
Waldron’s contrasting the two provisions is that speakers whose
utterances are reachable only under Section 5 do not constitute a
threat to the “precious public good” of “a visible assurance
offered by society to all of its members that they will not be
subject to abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimination, and
violence on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and in
some cases sexual orientation.”4
But is that true? Mark Norwood, described by Weinstein as
“a regional co-ordinator of the British National Party, a far-right
political organization,” was convicted under Section 5 for
displaying a poster of the World Trade Center in flames
superimposed by a crescent-and-star surrounded by a prohibition
sign and the statements “Islam out of Britain” and “Protect the
British people.”5 Harry Hammond, an evangelical preacher, was
convicted under the same provision for holding a placard in a
public square saying “Stop Immorality,” “Stop Homosexuality,”
“Stop Lesbianism,” “Jesus is Lord.”6 Weinstein calls this
conviction “an egregious example” of abuse of the power to
punish hate speech, and so it is. That said, wouldn’t British
Muslims and homosexuals be justified in considering these public
expressions at least as threatening to their civic standing by virtue
of how their society “looks”—the visibility of hate—as public
utterances that satisfy the intent or likely effects requirements of
Section 18 (1) of the Public Order Act?
Interestingly, Weinstein’s other examples of hate speech that
ought never to have been the subject of punishment are different
in a way that suggests Waldron would agree with that assessment.
Shawn Holes was convicted and made to pay a large fine for
3. Section five of the Public Order Act of 1986 is not limited to speech designed or
likely to stir up racial hatred. Instead, it prohibits both “threatening or abusive speech”
and “disorderly behavior” that occurs “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be
caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby.” Public Order Act 1986, § 5 (Eng.).
4. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1597, 1599 (2010).
5. See Norwood v. Dir. of Pub. Pros’ns, [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin),
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/1564.html.
6. See Hammond v. Dep’t of Pub. Pros’ns, [2004] EWHC 69, ¶ 5 (Admin),
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/69.html.
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responding to an interlocutor while speaking in a Glasgow street
by opining that “Homosexuals are deserving of the wrath of God,
and so are all other sinners, and they are going to a place called
hell.”7 Another street preacher, Michael Overd, was convicted in
Somerset for invoking Leviticus 20:13 for the proposition that
homosexuality is an “abomination.” Because that scriptural
passage prescribes the death penalty as punishment, the judge
found Mr. Overd’s exclamation to be in violation of Section 5 of
the Public Order Act.8 Both examples involved oral rather than
written denigration of minorities. On that account alone, even
were these angry statements to fail a temperance test they would
lack the ongoing visibility that Waldron considers the essence of
the threat to the public good of civic assurance.9
Although Waldron’s innovative public good argument adds
something new and undeniably pertinent to the hate speech
debate, deploying criminal sanctions against speakers as a way to
assure vulnerable minorities of their civic standing presents novel
challenges. At the end of the day, his is an argument about the
importance of maintaining an environment of trust. Although he
emphasizes outward manifestations of acceptance rather than
inward beliefs, creating and sustaining the requisite civic aesthetic
entails nurturing a working consensus about what to say in public
that by definition depends on beliefs. That working consensus, if
and when it exists, is unlikely to be fully formed. Not only are
dissenters likely to resent the prescribed aesthetic, they are
capable of subverting it even when their numbers are small.
To put it bluntly, the needed public assurance requires the
coercive enforcement, so far as public expression is concerned, of
an orthodoxy of sorts regarding the determinants of civic
standing. To his credit, Waldron faces up to this feature of his
argument and asserts that there is such a thing as effective

7. Mark Hennessy, Street Preacher Fined for ‘Homosexuals Going to Hell’ Remark,
IRISH TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/street-preacher-fined-forhomosexuals-going-to-hell-remark-1.646036. See also Preacher is Fined for Homophobia,
THE SCOTSMAN (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.scotsman.com/news/preacher-is-fined-forhomophobia-1-1365514.
8. John Bingham, Preacher Accuses Judge of ‘Redacting’ the Bible, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11505466/
Preacher-accuses-judge-of-redacting-the-Bible.html.
9. On the difference between written and spoken communication so far as
Waldron’s public good of civic assurance is concerned see Waldron, supra note 4, at 1603–
04.
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settlement of once divisive disputes over the significance for civic
standing of race, ethnicity, religion, and gender, for example. On
this topic, the need for foundational commitment trumps the
open-ended, designedly dynamic adjustment and evolution of
beliefs which is the hallmark of a marketplace of ideas. When
settlement has been achieved, Waldron maintains, the regnant
orthodoxy can then be enforced to the extent of punishing visible
dissent that takes an aggressive form which undermines the
assurance that enables civic security and participation.
All of which brings us back to the problem about Waldron
with which we began: he supplies no reason to tolerate temperate
criticism of the reigning determinants of civic standing any more
than intemperate criticism. Admittedly, he does intimate that laws
criminalizing intemperate hate speech are more likely to be aimed
at preventing bad effects and punishing bad intentions, and
thereby less likely to be efforts to “prohibit the expression of
certain views per se.”10 However, given the role that a specific
kind of orthodoxy plays in his conception of civic assurance, it is
not clear why Waldron ought to be particularly troubled by a law
that seeks to “prohibit the expression of certain views per se.”
Furthermore, temperate hate speech can be more subversive than
its intemperate counterpart of the assurance of civic dignity that
he prizes, so why aren’t laws punishing temperate hate speech also
best characterized as concerned about effects rather than “views
per se?”
An understanding of the freedom of speech that emphasized
such objectives as progress in understanding, democratic
character building, adaptation to changing conditions, the
exposure of corruption, or autonomous self-authorship might
deny full (or any) protection to speech that is ill-intentioned,
personally targeted, or abusively worded. But Waldron presents
his argument about hate speech without allusion to why speech
might be especially valuable as a general matter and how the
answer to that question bears on which communicative activities
fall with the ambit of the freedom of speech. So far as one can tell
from his exploration of the subject to date, the distinction
Waldron draws between the instances of hate speech that should
be subject to criminal sanctions and those which should not
derives from his judgment regarding which forms of this noxious
10.

Waldron, supra note 2, at 702.
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genre most subvert the assurance of civic dignity that all members
of a well-ordered political community are entitled to. As
explained above, I question that judgment regarding subversive
potential because I believe that temperate criticism of the
requisite foundational orthodoxy regarding civic standing is more
subversive than intemperate criticism.
Putting the point in terms of orthodoxy is not Waldron’s
formulation, though he does speak of foundational commitments
and does say that the obsession with viewpoint discrimination in
United States free speech law is overdone and simplistic.
Nevertheless, his concern for settlement, worry about the damage
that unreconciled dissenters can do to civic flourishing, invention
of a new public good, and characterization of civic dignity as “a
necessary ingredient of public order” all suggest a common-good
measure of well-being, one in which a sophisticated and bounded
notion of orthodoxy may have a place. If I am reading him
correctly on this point, temperate challenges to the civic standing
of vulnerable minorities pose more of a problem for Waldron than
he appreciates.
II.
James Weinstein differs from Waldron in at least two key
respects that bear on how to treat dissenters who might threaten
the assurance that is given to vulnerable minorities regarding their
civic standing. First, Weinstein relies heavily on the principle
against viewpoint discrimination in deciding which forms of hate
speech are regulable, in sharp contrast to Waldron’s lack of
enthusiasm for that principle as it has been elaborated in
American law.11 This leads Weinstein to protect more hate speech
than Waldron would, and for different reasons. Second,
Weinstein derives from the premise of equal civic standing for all
members of the community not only the need for assurance to
vulnerable minorities that Waldron emphasizes, but also the need
for strong legitimation of antidiscrimination laws, which he
believes matter more to the civic standing of vulnerable minorities
than the aesthetic environment of assurance that Waldron seeks.
Weinstein
maintains
that
the
legitimation
of
antidiscrimination laws depends on extending to those who
11. Compare Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545–46, with Waldron, supra note 2, at 713,
and Waldron, supra note 4, at 1638–39.
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oppose such laws the freedom to criticize them, by employing
either temperate or intemperate forms of hate speech if they
choose, so long as their messages are not threateningly targeted
against particular individuals. In a deft move, he bolsters the
argument for that kind of robust free speech right by deriving it
from the very premise of equal civic standing that underlies
Waldron’s public good of assurance. In Weinstein’s view, that
status generates in each member of the community a right “to
participate as an equal in the public conversation about society’s
collective decisions.”12 This right to participate does not depend
on the speaker having views that stand a chance of being adopted:
“an individual has an interest in expressing his or her views on a
matter of public concern not just in the hope of influencing others
‘but also just to confirm his or her standing as a responsible agent
in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action.’”13 In arguing
to protect temperate forms of hate speech, Weinstein establishes
common ground with Waldron. However, the two differ regarding
whether intemperate forms of hate speech deserve protection in
certain instances14 —Weinstein says yes, Waldron says no—and
whether the legitimation of antidiscrimination laws is an
important reason to protect speech that disputes the civic standing
of vulnerable minorities. Weinstein believes it is; Waldron does
not.
Weinstein has much to say about legitimation. I find helpful
his account of how a person’s having been accorded the
opportunity to “participate as an equal in the public conversation
about society’s collective decisions” bears on his willingness as a
descriptive matter to obey a law he opposed at the time of
passage, his normative obligation to obey such a law, and the
morality of society using coercive means to make him comply with
that law. I agree with Weinstein that the last of these three
dimensions of legitimation is the one that should most concern us
for the purpose of evaluating hate speech regulation. I particularly
like his argument that a strong enough moral justification for a
particular law can outweigh a deficit in enabling equal
participation so far as legitimating coercive enforcement is
concerned. I also believe that Weinstein is correct to identify cases
12.
13.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 528.
Id. at 550 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND
DEMOCRACY, vii (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009)).
14. Compare id. at 548–50, 545–46 with Waldron, supra note 4, at 701–02.
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denying claims of exemption from nondiscrimination laws on
religious grounds as the domain where having been accorded
sufficient speech rights at the time of a law’s passage carries the
most significance so far as legitimation is concerned.
Waldron questions the cogency of any kind of legitimation
test that turns on whether a person subject to a nondiscrimination
law has been given the opportunity to “participate as an equal” in
the public discussion that led to passage of the law. In his view,
political contestation that eventuates in legislation is “a swirling
maelstrom of informal debate” about which “we have no way of
keeping track of who says what to whom, who speaks, and who
listens.” He says:
[T]he best we can do is to say that everyone may participate as
they like, though everyone agrees there are limits on how
inflammatory their participation can be . . . . And if—for
reasons of social peace—limits are placed on other effects that
inflammatory speech may have, I don’t think the background
public discourse is orderly enough to enable us to infer precise
deontic conclusions about the individual rights that flow or do
not flow from the political process.15

Because Weinstein’s right to equal participation via speech
lacks cogency in this way, Waldron concludes, narrowly drawn
hate speech laws are not vulnerable on legitimation grounds for
having denied speakers equal participation in the public
conversation. At least that is so when those laws have “a positive
relation to the integrity of the political process” and can be
justified in terms of such matters as their capacity to prevent harm
and their safeguards against arbitrary or corrupt enforcement. As
he puts it: “if it is only unjustified restrictions on speech that affect
legitimacy, then it looks as though we will have to settle the
question of justification first, before we assess the impact on
legitimacy.”16
Does Weinstein have an answer to this powerful critique? If
he does, I believe it has to lie in the way he develops and applies
the principle against viewpoint regulation. Hate speech regulation
is undeniably viewpoint discriminatory. Conventional First
Amendment analysis is deeply skeptical of such regulation on that
account. In turn, Jeremy Waldron is deeply skeptical of

15.
16.

Waldron, supra note 4, at 710–11.
Id. at 712.
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conventional First Amendment doctrine on the same account. A
first step in deciding who is right is to get clear exactly why, as a
philosophical matter, viewpoint discrimination is so disfavored in
some circles. Despite its dominant place in the law of the First
Amendment, the possible reasons for the principle against
viewpoint discrimination have not been developed as thoroughly
as one might have supposed. One of the contributions of James
Weinstein’s article on hate speech in this symposium is its fresh
account of why viewpoint discrimination might be problematic.
One of the earliest efforts to explain the principle against
viewpoint discrimination was advanced by Judge Learned Hand
in a 1920 letter to Professor Zechariah Chafee. Hand said:
[A]ny State which professes to be controlled by public opinion,
cannot take sides against any opinion except that which must
express itself in the violation of law. On the contrary, it must
regard all other expression of opinion as tolerable, if not good.
As soon as it does not, it inevitably assumes that one opinion
may control in spite of what might become an opposite opinion.
It becomes a State based upon some opinion, as against any
opinion which may get itself accepted . . . .17

As I understand Waldron, he favors “a State based upon
some opinion” regarding the traits that can never diminish a
person’s civic standing, which is one reason he is skeptical about
the principle against viewpoint discrimination.
Geoffrey Stone has proposed a different justification. He
suggests that viewpoint discriminatory laws are presumptively
invalid because they “distort public debate” and “mutilate[] ‘the
thinking process of the community.’”18 That rationale also does
not impress Professor Waldron:
Now, words like “distort” and “mutilate” beg the question,
privileging what public debate would be like without
intervention. It is worth asking why we should privilege the
unregulated process or its output. . . . Stone is surely right to
point out that restrictions on group defamation or hate speech
are intended to modify the character of public debate. That is
the whole point.19

17. Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Jan. 8, 1920, reprinted in
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 723, 764–65 (1975).
18. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 55 (1987).
19. Waldron, supra note 4, at 1639.
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James Weinstein offers a third and quite distinctive
indictment of viewpoint discrimination. He considers the
principle against viewpoint discrimination to derive from the
premise that each member of the community has equal civic
standing. In this account, viewpoint discrimination is not about
the quality of public debate or the rightful sources of
governmental authority, but rather the equal treatment of
individuals. Respect for the civic dignity of each individual
speaker may preclude the state from deploying its criminal law,
and perhaps other sources of general leverage, to favor the ideas
of some speakers over those of others. If that is right, Weinstein’s
effort to support his case against hate speech regulation need not
depend on his imaginative legitimation argument, which Waldron
has questioned effectively. Rather, Weinstein has a more
straightforward line of support, grounded in his novel rationale
for the venerable principle against viewpoint regulation.
One advantage of understanding the principle against
viewpoint discrimination as deriving from the commitment to
equal civic standing is that it raises the possibility of
commensurability between the competing claims of right in the
hate speech controversy. Both claims—respectively, to
communicate one’s disturbing opinions and to be assured of one’s
rightful place in the polity—sound in civic dignity. Both are claims
of individual entitlement to a collective good by virtue of
collective commitment. In these respects, the common currency
of the competing claims is greater than is true for other possible
commensurabilities that Weinstein discusses and finds wanting: 1)
that between the good, which may follow from prohibiting hate
speech, of assuring minorities of their civic standing, and the good,
which may follow from not prohibiting hate speech, of
contributing to the legitimation of antidiscrimination laws; and 2)
that between the system-legitimating effects of tolerating group
defamation and the system-delegitimating effects of deterring
vulnerable minorities from speaking or otherwise participating in
democratic governance.
So what can be said about the competing, possibly
commensurable, claims to civic dignity of a speaker who wishes to
engage in hateful group defamation and a victim of such speech?
Framed this way, with the focus on the civic dignity of the
individual person rather than systemic benefits, such as political
and legal legitimacy, quality of public discourse, general
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knowledge, social stability, progress, or trust, the comparison
need not reduce to rival claims of an empirical nature, mostly
speculative and often broad-ranging. Instead, we might ask what
are the essential components of the concept of civic dignity, and
how are they vindicated or violated, conceptually rather than
empirically, by regulating or failing to regulate hate speech.
Notions about the proper ends and means of government
intervention are bound to play a role in this kind of inquiry. If
commensurability does indeed exist, a resolution of the hate
speech controversy that maximizes the sum of the civic dignity of
the parties is a worthy objective, as is a resolution that lexically
privileges any components of civic dignity that might be regarded
as at the core of the concept.
In the space appropriate for a critical response in a
symposium, I cannot do justice to either the importance or the
complexity of the task of comparison I have just outlined. I can,
however, offer a few discrete observations about some of the
variables.
First, I don’t think that the obvious moral disparity between
the rival claimants to civic dignity in the hate speech controversy
ought to influence the comparison. The very notion of civic
dignity entails that morally unworthy members of the community
are entitled to civic status equal to that accorded the most
admirable members. That, in part, is what the rule of law is all
about.
Second, the most important value at stake in the comparison,
as I see it, is freedom of thought. Professor Waldron recognizes
this when he insists that a person’s ideas cannot be regulated on
the basis that they offend others,20 and also when he makes clear
that his proposal to punish hate speech is not designed to change
the opinions or attitudes of the speakers, but rather to make their
vile opinions less visible, so as to protect the civic self-regard of
their targeted victims.21 Assurance, the good that is claimed by
those who would regulate hate speech under Waldron’s theory, is
important largely because it enables the free thought of the
victims—thought undistorted by concerns about personal safety
or insecurity about belonging—and through that their capacity to
act civically. Even though he does not mention the connection, his
20.
21.

See Waldron, supra note 4, at 1612–14.
Id. at 1633.
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prioritization of freedom of thought supports Waldron’s position
that only group defamation published with the intention to cause
hate and using words designed to threaten or abuse should be
subject to criminal sanctions. Temperate expressions of noxious
views about the lack of civic standing of minorities may well cause
as much or more harm to their civic dignity as does speech that
combines such evil ideas with aggressive intentions or words, but
objection to the thought itself is more likely to be driving a
regulation of hate speech when these additional features are not
a precondition for punishment.
Third, the fact that assurance of civic standing is a more
fragile and subtle state of affairs than is freedom from formal
government sanctions is relevant in comparing the rival claims to
civic dignity of the speaker and victim. This disparity is most
regrettable but undeniably real. Law can only do what it can do.
As a practical matter, it is possible to respect the civic dignity of
speakers engaging in hate speech when all that is required is
granting them immunity from coercive government sanctions for
their speech. (Such speakers, of course, enjoy no immunity from
social punishment, should they reveal their nasty opinions beyond
their own narrowest circles. Given that, their formal negative
liberty may not leave them truly free in a broader sense to think
what they will.) Less possible is according the victims of hate
speech respect for their civic dignity when what is required is
meaningful assurance of their civic standing. We might, of course,
define the civic dignity at issue to relate only to be how the hate
speech victims are treated by government rather than by the
society as a whole. For assurance to do the work Waldron
envisions, however, I would think there would have to be
substantial buy-in from the public at large, albeit buy-in generated
by government policy. As a result, vindicating the civic dignity of
minorities assaulted by hate speech is more difficult, practically
speaking, than vindicating the civic dignity of speakers who
engage in group defamation. I would not give this disparity in
what is practically possible a great deal of weight in the
comparison, but I do think it should count somewhat in favor of
the claims of the speakers.
Fourth, the claim to civic dignity derives, it would seem, from
the type of regime that a person lives under. It is not a natural
right, if such a thing exists. Perhaps civic dignity is regimedependent not only in origin but also in specific contours. A
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liberal monarchy or oligarchy might be expected to have a
different conception of civic dignity than a republic. The United
States might have a different conception than Great Britain or
France, on account of its cultural self-image, and perhaps even
worldwide iconic status, as a participatory democracy. All this
could bear on the hate speech issue in that the claim to assurance
of civic standing might be understood as particularly important in
a regime that entrusts its ordinary citizens with a great deal of
political responsibility, not to mention a regime that has a history
of systematic exclusion from political responsibility of
populations now expected to participate in governance. On the
other hand, specific to the form that republican government has
taken in this country, at least for a century, is an almost
inexplicable prioritization of the freedom of speech. I suppose
that could cut two ways: perhaps our understanding of civic
dignity needs to guard against overvaluing that particular
freedom. But if the governing conception of civic dignity should
be regime-specific in part so as to express some sort of collective
identity, the claim to speak one’s mind however benighted—a
stronger claim than to be free to embrace nefarious opinions
under wraps—has to be given great weight in any comparison of
rival claims in the United States.

